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THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Long before actions either for breach of contract or for negli-
gence were permitted, actions for injuries caused by the careless
or unskillful performance of undertakings were common.' In
the typical case the plaintiff, relying on the promise or represen-
tation of the defendant or on the skill usual to his calling, per-
mitted the defendant to deal with his person or property. This
' Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 129 et seq. Holmes, The Com-
mon Law (1881) 183, 275.
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permission in the eyes of the law at that ancient day absolved the
defendant from responsibility for the results of his act-the deal-
ing with the plaintiff's person or property. But the permission
was given by the plaintiff only in reliance on the false represen-
tation of the defendant as to the services to be rendered. Thus
the damage was related to the misleading representation of the
defendant. The remedy allowed was an action on the case for a
misfeasance. Such actions were not for breach of contract: they
could not be grounded on a mere nonfeasance, and consideration
in its modern sense was no part of the plaintiff's case.2  They
were closely related to actions for deceit on a warranty of goods-
in fact, they were substantially actions on warranty of careful
and skillful service.3 In the same group was the action against
a bailee. In all, the gist of the wrong was the misleading of the
plaintiff to his harm.4
Actions on warranties of goods are nowadays usually regarded
as contractual in their nature; but a delictual theory of recovery
is frequently insisted upon, the gist of which is still the mislead-
ing of the plaintiff.5 In cases of imperfect performance of serv-
ice contracts, the action is sometimes treated as sounding in con-
tract," and sometimes as in tort for negligent injury.T  It is be-
-Elsee v. Gatward (1793, K. B.) 5 Durnf. & E. 143, 150; Hyde v. Mof-
fatt (1844) 16 Vt. 271
3 "A person holding himself out to do certain work, impliedly warrants
his possession of skill reasonably competent for its performance." 2 Beven,
Negligence in Law (3d ed. 1908) 1127.
4 Ames, loc. cit. sv.pra note 1. ". . . a neglect is a deceit to the bailor.
For when he entrusts the bailee upon his undertaking to be careful, he
has put a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent, his pretense of
care being the persuasion that induced the plaintiff to trust him." Lord
Holt, C. J., in Coggs v. Bernard (1703, Q. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 910.
Needless to say Lord Holt does not refer to deceit in the limited sense in
which it is now understood. "Deceit" formerly had a much wider signifi-
cance. "In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one
offers his services, he is understood, as holding himself out to the public
as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same
employment and if his pretensions are unfounded, he commits a specic of
fraud upon every man who employs him in reliance on his public profe3-
sion." 2 Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 1906) 1386, *777.
-1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) 369; Carter -o. Glass (1880) 44 'Mich.
154.
G ". . .where the action is not maintainable without pleading or prov-
ing the contract-where the gist of the action is the breach of the con-
tract, either by malfeasance or nonfeasance-it is, in substance, whatever
may be the form of the pleading, an action on the contract . . ."
Mitchel, J., in Whitaker v. Colzs (1835) 34 Minn. 299, 300, 25 1. W. 632,
633 (action for malpractice); Ward v. St. Vincents Hospital (1309, 1st.
Dept.) 39 App. Div. 624, 57 N. Y. Supp. 784 (contract to provide a sillful
nurse) ; Masters v. Stratton (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 7 Hill, 101 (contract to
operate farm and care for live stock); Cook v. Haggarty (1359) 3G Pa. G7
(the same).
7 For example, an attorney may be sued in tort for negligence in the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lieved that a comparatively small number of modern misperform-
ance cases are cases of proper negligence8 and that these are the
ones that would have supported the old writ of trespass on the case
for a misfeasance-those, in other words, where the misfeasance
involves an affirmative dealing with the plaintiff's person or prop-
erty. And even these, it is submitted, are more profitably treated
as cases of breach of contract unless the familiar doctrines of
negligence are recast to give the fact of contract and its disarm-
ing effect on the promisee full operative value. The old misfeas-
ance action had at least the merit-which the modern negligence
action has not-of stressing what is the most important element
of the situation-the misleading of the plaintiff to his harm.
A recent case, Craig v. Anyon (1925, 1st Dept.) 212 App. Div.
55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259, presents such a situation. The plaintiffs,
stock and commodity brokers, had in their employ one X who is
variously described in the opinion as a department head, margin
clerk, and head bookkeeper. At the request of certain customers
he was authorized by the plaintiffs to carry on trading in com-
modities on behalf of such customers as long as their margins
remained intact. X's trading, it seems, very quickly exhausted
these margins; but he continued his speculations, ostensibly on
behalf of the customers, during a period of five years thereafter.
His losses appeared on plaintiffs' books as credit balances due the
brokers with whom X had dealt. Large sums were paid out by
the plaintiffs in discharge of such apparent debts, although there
were no offsetting charges against customers, no customers being
chargeable with these losses. Likewise customers were credited
with profits never realized and considerable sums disbursed in
reliance on the showing of these accounts. Here again, of course,
no offsetting charges were possible since no brokers were respon-
sible to the plaintiffs for such false profits. The defendants, a
firm of public accountants, were retained by the plaintiffs over
the same five year period to perform quarterly audits. Had the
defendants inspected all the plaintiffs' books and checked them
against each other, the falsifications would have been discovered
and further defalcations prevented. The defendants, however,
omitted to inspect certain books, accepting instead statements
prepared and offered by the defaulter, purporting to be sum-
maries of the contents of the books not inspected. The plaintiffs
knew the audits were not sufficiently thorough to determine the
performance of services for his client. Watson v. Calvert Bldg. Assn.
(1900) 91 Md. 25, 45 Atl. 879; of. treatment of actions for malpractice in
Geiselman v. Scott (1874) 25 Ohio, 86; Baird v. Morford (1870) 29 Iowa,
531; cf. also Armelio v. Whitman (1908) 127 Mo. App. 698 (negligence in
raising building).
8 That is to say, cases in which the duty of care exists regardless of
contract.
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actual standing of the firm, but they were assured by the defend-
ants that the books were properly kept. At the trial two ques-
tions were submitted to the jury: (1) Were the defendants negli-
gent? (2) If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted proxi-
mately and directly therefrom-the amount paid the defendants
as compensation for making the audit or the total amounts paid
out, as alleged, in reliance thereon? The jury found the defend-
ants negligent and returned a verdict for all the sums disbursed.
The court agreed that the defendants were negligent, but held
that the only damage proximately resulting was the amount paid
as compensation. Both parties appealed. The judgment was
affirmed (one judge dissenting) on the grounds (1) that the real
cause of the loss was to be found in the fact that the defaulter
had been given a free hand to trade for the customers above men-
tioned, (2) that the plaintiffs acquiesced in the defendants'
omissions, (3) that the plaintiffs were guilty of contributory neg-
ligence in making payments to brokers and customers without
personally determining that the payments were actually due by
checking the accounting before each payment," and (4) that the
chain of causation was broken by the intervening criminal acts
of the employee.
The court quoted with approval opinions to the effect that the
action was not one of tort but for breach of contract.- Yet
throughout, it dealt with the case as it would have dealt with one
for negligent injury. The case clearly does not come within the
scope of the ancient misfeasance actions, for there is no dealing
with the plaintiffs' persons or property; moreover, there is no gen-
eral duty to use care in speaking or writing.11 It is, therefore, sub-
mitted that no action for harm resulting from a negligent audit
could possibly be maintained in the absence of a promise to audit
given under circumstances amounting to consideration. In view
of this, it seems strange to classify the action as other than con-
tractual. Substantively considered, an imperfect performance
is not less a breach of contract or more a tort than total failure
to perform. If it be argued that the contract raises a tort duty
of careful performance conditional upon the contractor's actually
beginning to perform, it is difficult to see why this is not merged
O It is not clear whether the court meant that the plaintiffs relied on
the oral representations of X without even looking at the accounts or that
the plaintiffs relied on the prima facie showing of each customer's or
broker's account without analysis or comparison of one account with the
other. If the former, since inspection would have disclosed apparent agree-
ment between the accounts and X's oral representations, failure to inspect
cannot be said to have had any causal significance. If the court meant
the latter, the plaintiffs, as will be shown, was under no necessity to analyze
and compare.
-10212 App. Div. at 66, 208 N. Y. Supp. at 268.
3"1 Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HAnv. L. Ruv.
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in the unconditional contract duty of the same tenor. That there
would, in a common law state, be a choice of remedy is conceded ;12
but even if the remedy chosen were case for negligent injury, the
contract would have to be shown, and, as suggested above, the
rules of negligence would have to be given special content to
apply properly to the situation.
In the proper negligence case the defendant has done nothing
to lead the plaintiff to expect one course of action rather than
another. It is obviously otherwise when a contract has been
made. The contractor actively induces the contractee to rely on
his doing certain things. The essence of contract as distinguished
from zudum pactum is that the promise is one that it is reason-
able to rely upon. After contract, the promisee should be, and is,
entitled to put the matter from his mind unless and until he is
apprised that there is no intention to perform. Then he "must
mitigate damages". 3
Should a factually imperfect but apparently perfect perform-
ance make reliance on perfect performance no longer proper?
Should active vigilance by the plaintiff be a condition precedent
to recovery for harm consequent upon the defendant's breach?
Factually the relations of the parties are changed so that of the
two the contractee is now the better circumstanced to discover a
default: the services are rendered-the goods are delivered. If
the contractor was unwittingly careless or unskilful in his serv-
ices or unknowingly has delivered defective goods, it is reason-
able to require the contractee to prevent harm from ensuing if
he can. And so, while he should be entitled to assume perform-
ance, if facts pointing to a default come to his attention, he
184; Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1910) 24 I-IAn'V.
L. RLv. 415.
19 "Under the contract negligently erroneous statements and imprudent
advice become torts, on the same principle that under a warranty an
erroneous statement was a deceit by the old common law, without even
negligence." Holmes, J., in Corey v. Eastman (1896) 166 Mass. 279, 287,
44 N. E. 217, 218. ". . . wherever there is a contract and something
to be done in the course of the employment which is the subject of that
contract, if there is a breach of duty in the course of that employment,
the plaintiff may recover either in tort or contract." Lord Campbell in
Brown v. Boorman (1844, H. L.) 11 C1. & F. 1, 44.
13 Thus where knowledge comes by way of total breach at the date sot
for performance, the measure of damages to a buyer is the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the date and place set
for performance. Schopfloeher v. Zimmermann (1925) 240 N. Y. 507. But
where from the nature of the contract the contractee cannot be expected
to learn of the breach until long after the date set for performance, the
damage is measured as of the date of notice. Camden Cons. Oil Co. v.
Schlens (1882) 59 Md. 31. Where knowledge comes by way of repudiation
before the plaintiff has completed his performance, he can not increase
damages by continuing it. Clark v. Marsigliac (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 1
Denio, 317. Prospective inability to perform has occasionally been recog-
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should investigate; but if the result of investigation is such as
would allay the suspicions of a reasonable man, he should be en-
titled safely to proceed.14 Nor should suspicion as to the exist-
ence of some fact unrelated to the contractor's default bar re-
covery where the suspected fact does not exist and where, in
addition, there is nothing to cause suspicion of defendant's de-
fault. 5 However slight the degree of vigilance necessary to dis-
cover the defendant's default, the plaintiff's failure to exercise it
should never, in the absence of suspicious circumstances, bar his
recovery for harm consequent upon the breach of contract. 0
This is an absolutely necessary rule for the law of business
relations. Any other rule would have every man minding every
other man's business. Eternal vigilance may be a good rule for
primitive communities and one-man businesses, but in a highly
organized society one must be permitted to rely on the under-
taking of others in ordering his own activity. Otherwise no divi-
sion of labor, no specialization of function is possible. This rule
puts the legal responsibility on him who has the economic func-
tion. This is proper since he is the one best circumstanced to
fend off harm. The proper discharge of his function protects
him from loss and others from injury. 7
Of course, the contractee may rely only for purposes within
nized as an anticipatory breach. See for example Central Trust Co. v.
Chicago Auditorium Assoc. (1916) 210 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct 412.
14 The contractee may rely except in the face of facts putting him on
inquiry. Gascoigne v. Cary Brick Co. (1914) 217 Mass. I02, 104 N. E.
734; Bagley v. Cleveland R. M. Co. (1834, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 21 Fed. 159.
Is But see (1924) 2 CAmB. L. JouR. 82.
16 "The plaintiff's misconduct consisted in a failure to discover by in-
spection a defect in an article specially made for it. . . . Such a failure
might make the plaintiff answerable to its men, but even if its conduct
be called want of ordinary care it was induced . . . by the warranty or
representations of the defendant." Holmes, C. J., in Boston IW. H. & R.
Co. v. Kendall (1901) 178 Mass. 232, 237, 59 N. E. 657. "The plaintiffs
owed no duty to the defendants to examine the chain before allowinq it
to be used by their workmen. The only duty they owed in that respect
was to the workmen." Lord Esher in Mowvbray v. Mcrrywcathcr [1805]
2 Q. B. 640, 644. But see Birdsinger v. McCormiich H. M!. Co. (190) 183
N. Y. 487, 76 N. E. 611; and cf. MacPhcrson v. Baick. otor Co. (1916)
217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
17 The possible loss to the auditor is admittedly great, and the extent
of the loss bears no relation to the extent of the breach. He is an insurer
against all harm caused, in a legal sense, by his carelessness; but so is
every negligent person. See Corbin, Rights and Duties (1923) 33 YAi"
LAw JouRNAL, 501, 524 et seq. To argue against the imposition of re-
sponsibility for consequential harm that it would drive auditors out of
business is to argue that because the danger of harm to the contractee is
very great, the penalty for carelessness should be very small-an absurd
conclusion. The auditor's remedy is to be careful. He warrants care and
skill only, not absolute accuracy of result.
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the reasonable contemplation of the contractor.18 The conven-
tional purposes of an audit are (1) the detection and prevention
of fraud and error and (2) the ascertainment of the actual finan-
cial condition and earnings of the enterprise.O It seems clear
that it should be a breach of contract ("negligence", misfeas-
ance) as a matter of definite law for an auditor to accept the
results of any accounting process without analysis, whether prof-
fered by an ordinary clerk or by an employee manager.0 If the
objects of an audit are kept in mind, this can not be doubtful.
Jufy, judge, and appellate justices were in accord as to the mis-
feasance of the defendants in the instant case, but it should, it
seems, have been so ruled as a matter of definite law.
The evidence relied upon to show that the plaintiffs acquiesced
in the defendants' misfeasance was the statement of the latter
that they could not certify the actual financial condition of the
company without making certain calculations which they had
omitted. The plaintiffs never objected; but the quarterly audits
continued. Clearly the audits had some purpose; and since this
evidence rules out the second of the conventional objectives above
noted, it makes it more certain that the purpose of these par-
ticular audits was the discovery of fraud and error and that the
plaintiffs relied on the statements of the defendants that there
was neither.
It is matter of common knowledge that in large business enter-
prises, it is necessary for a proprietor to delegate to employees
many functions, some discretionary, which in a smaller business
he would discharge himself. The larger the business, the less
supervision he can give such employees. It is not ordinarily
thought to be baa business practice so to delegate what in a
smaller business would be proprietary functions, or to omit per-
sonal supervision. Neither is it thought bad business practice
to pay bills in the usual course of business on the prima facie
showing of accounts. In the nature of the case reliance must be
had on the representations of the employees to whom the pro-
prietor has entrusted the keeping of these accounts. But the
danger of the situation is apparent. The check the business
18 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341.
19 1 Montgomery, Auditing: Theory and Practice (1922) 19. "There can
oe no doubt but that the business public look upon the discovery of fraud
as an important object to be attained by an audit. . . ." ibid. at 21.
20 The court conceded the misfeasance but cited In re Kingston Cotton
Mill Co. (No. 2) [1896] 2 Ch. 279, for the proposition that the acceptance
of summaries proffered by employee managers is not misfeasance. But
in that case there was not, as in the instant case, any certain way of
analyzing and checking the summary in question. "The detection of fraud
is first in the logical presentation of the objects of an audit, because less
experience is required to unearth it. M ." ontgomery, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 21.
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community has developed is the disinterested third-party expert
-the public accountant, or auditor. If this piece of machinery
is to be of real value to the business man, he must be legally safe
in relying upon it.-
In the instant case the plaintiffs entrusted their dishonest em-
ployee with various functions, some discretionary, which, as the
event proved, enabled him to effect his dishonest ends. But this
entrusting was antecedent to the first audit and each report of
the auditors constituted an assurance that to date the entrusting
had been justified and that disbursements to date in reliance on
the employee's representations had been properly made. Twenty
times the auditors made that report. It is not surprising that
they induced great faith in the trusted employee, and that very
large payments were finally made on the strength of his repre-
sentations that they were due. Unless the size of the payments
or the attendant circumstances were such as should have aroused
the plaintiffs' suspicions and such as should have led the plain-
tiffs to investigate, the auditors are chargeable with the losses,
since but for their omissions the losses subsequent to the first
audit would not have occurred. Neither intervention in time of
the plaintiffs' continued acts in reliance on the dishonest employee
nor the intervention of that employee's criminal acts is fatal to
the plaintiffs' case, since both were to be anticipated-the former
as the plaintiffs' established business practice, the latter as the
very thing the contract was made to detect and prevent. It is
to be feared that the court took the requirement of proximity
between cause and effect to mean proximity in time rather than
proximity in contemplation.22
It has been said that the continuation of the plaintiffs' estab-
lished business practices was to be anticipated; but it must be
emphasized that radical departures therefrom were not. The
21It may be argued that the fidelity bond is the proprietor's remedy;
but the availability of insurance has not in other fields of the law relieved
contractors of their responsibility. Cf. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp.
v. Hooker Electro-Chemical Co. (1925) 240 N. Y. 37, 147 N. E. 351.
-There is no general principle that the intervening criminal act of
a third party always breaks the chain of causation. See forged check:
cases cited in note 23, infra. Also Deane v. Michigan Stove Co. (1896)
69 Ill. App. 106. Recovery of moneys embezzled by employee of plaintiff
has been allowed against auditors employed to check plaintiff's cash ac-
count where but for their carelessness the embezzlement could not have
occurred. Smith v. London Assurance Corp. (1905, 2d Dept.) 109 App.
Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820; contra: City of East Grand Forks v. Stccle
(1913) 121 Blinn. 296, 141 N. W. 181. There is no responsibility for a
negligent audit to a stranger to the contract who makes a losing invest-
ment in reliance thereon. Landell v. Lybrand (1919) 264 Pa. 406, 107
Atl. 783. But quaere where the audit is intended and known to the auditor
to be intended for the benefit of a third party? Cf. the responsibility of
a title abstractor on similar facts. Anderson v. Spriestcrbach (1912) 69
Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166.
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true rule of damages for the instant case is to be discerned in
another New York decision, Critten v. Chemical National Bank .2 3
In that case the plaintiff depositor sought to recover the amount
of a series of twenty-four checks, forged and presented by one
of his employees and paid by the defendant bank in twenty-four
separate instances scattered over a period of some two years.
During that time the verification of the bi-monthly bank state-
ment was entrusted by the plaintiff to the forger. The forgeries
were, of course, not reported to the bank. There was no evidence
that the failure to discover and report the forgeries had deprived
the bank of opportunity of restitution from the forger on the
checks paid prior to the first hi-monthly statement. It was held
that the bank could not charge the depositor with such checks
unless deprivation of the opportunity for restitution had resulted.
As to subsequent checks it was held that the bank might charge
the depositor's account therewith unless negligent in making the
payments; and negligence seems to have meant payment in the
face of facts that would put a reasonable man on inquiry, for the
power to charge the depositor was denied on one of the subse-
quent checks paid in the face of indicia of forgery. Futhermore,
the power to charge was denied on all checks subsequent thereto,
since but for the bank's omission to get a confirmation of the
suspicious check from the depositor, the forgery would have been
disclosed to the depositor and the forger dismissed. The court
speaks of the depositor's omission to report forgeries as mis-
leading the bank to its prejudice. Absence of notice may be as-
sumed- by the bank to mean that reported payments were in fact
authorized and that similar payments may safely be made. But
there is nothing to mislead the bank into thinking that dissimilar
payments or much larger or much more numerous payments may
safely be made. Such dissimilarity or disparity in size or number
of the checks presented by the forger would be a circumstance
to put the bank on inquiry.
So, in the instant case, the auditor was not chargeable with
payments made prior to the first audit unless the non-discovery
deprived the plaintiffs of the opportunity of obtaining restitution
from the defaulting employee. As to payments subsequent to
the first audit, each should be considered separately. Unless the
disbursements made were much larger than usual or much more
numerous than usual or unless there were other circumstances
present to put the plaintiffs on inquiry, the auditor should be
chargeable. It may be that the fact adverted to in the opinion
that there had been in three months an apparent change of posi-
2 (1902) 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969. Accord: National Dredging Co.
v. Farmers' Bank (1908, Del.) 6 Penn. 580, 69 At. 607. For other cases
and general discussion see Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of the De-
positor to his Bank (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 598.
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tion of some $500,000 was such a circumstance as demanded in-
vestigation; but in any event this circumstance can not be con-
sidered apart from the fact that twenty assurances by the auditor
had antedated it. And this circumstance has no bearing on the
question of the auditors' responsibility for earlier payments.
It is believed that the treatment of such cases as this as sound-
ing in tort for negligent injury is to be explained in part as a
survival from the ancient misfeasance cases and in part as mere
"mechanical jurisprudence". He who contracts to render Serv-
ices is bound to exercise the care and skill of the ordinary pru-
dent member of his profession or calling. This looks like "the
care of the reasonably prudent man under the circumstances"
and such it probably is. But the use of this label has led to the
application in many of these cases of the familiar doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, and this is undesirable. "Due care", to most
minds, lay and legal, carries the concept of active vigilance. This
should not be required of the plaintiff contractee. That "objec-
tive good faith"-the rule here contended for-is in the light of
careful analysis really "due care under the circumstances", is no
excuse for submitting to the jury, without more, the question of
the contractee's contributory negligence.2-  The jury need the
guidance of a rule of more definite content-a rule that will em-
phasize and take into kccount, as did the ancient misfeasance
actions, the misleading behavior of the contractor.
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS AND PLEADING
Perhaps a single regret may accompany the passing of com-
mon law pleading :-that there also passed the "special pleader".
This type of lawyer has always been reputed to possess great
ability. At least he had a keen interest in and enthusiasm for the
study of pleading. Now we are met with the seeming paradox
that often the abler the lawyer, the less enthusiasm he has for
pleading problems. An excellent example of this is to be found
in the attitude of the New York Court of Appeals towards code
24". .. the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to
use such care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought
to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to
use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances. The stand-
ard which the defendant was bound to come up to was a standard of
specific acts or omissions, with reference to the specific circumstance in
which he found himself. If in the whole department of unintentional
wrongs, the courts arrived at no further utterance than the question of
negligence, and left every case, without rudder or compass, to the jury,
they would simply confess their inability to state a very large part of the
law which they required the defendant to know, and would assert, by im-
plication, that nothing could be learned by experience." Holmes, The Com-
-nn Law (1881) ill.
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pleading. That court has always ranked as one of the ablest
tribunals in the country, and the reputation of its present per-
sonnel is justly as high as at any time in its history. Yet clearly
the court has no consistent theory of the function of pleading in
the modern judicial system. Its early hostility to the infant code
is well known. Thereafter more liberal views intermittently pre-
vailed. But in comparatively recent years there has been a retro-
gression to ancient technicalities, particularly in the attempted
resurrection of distinctions between law and equity., Neverthe-
less, the passage in 1920 by the legislature of the Civil Practice
Act and the attempt of the court to give effect to the more liberal
provisions as to joinder of parties in that Act led again to a broad-
ening of some of the pleading concepts held by the court, notably
that of the cause of action. 2 Now in its latest pronouncement
there has again been a most violent reaction towards the past.
In Ader v. Blau (1925) 241 N. Y. 11, the plaintiff, suing
to recover damages for the death of his intestate, a young
boy, set up two counts: in one, charging that the first
defendant had negligently maintained an iron picket fence,
upon which the intestate had been injured in a manner causing
infection and death; and, in the other, alleging that the intestate,
being injured by a picket fence, came to the second defendant as
a physician and surgeon for treatment And was so negligently
treated by the latter that solely by reason thereof he died. The
court held, Cardozo, J., dissenting, that the joinder was im-
proper.2
It will be seen that the situation was the not unusual one where
the plaintiff was in doubt as to just what the proof at the trial
would disclose. He felt that he had a possible claim against
either or both of the defendants and he desired to lay the whole
case before the court and let it decide. Why is this not socially
desirable? Instead of two cases with much of the testimony
identical there is only one, and the time of courts, of litigants, and
of the witnesses-a most meritorious but little considered class--
is saved. The court, however, does not approach the case from
this angle. It begins its discussion by saying that if the joinder
is permissible, "a step has been taken away from prior rules of
practice and procedure which will be regarded as a long and
I See Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 1;
COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 707.
2 See Cleveland Cliffs Iron Works v. Keusch (1923) 237 N. Y. 533, 143
N. E. 731; and discussion in Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33
YALE LAW JoURNAL, 817. Cf. Sherlock v. Manwaren (1924, 4th Dept.)
208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. '709. For the joinder of 193 plaintiffs
who claimed to have been deceived by the same false prospectus of stock,
see Akely v. Kinnicutt (1924) 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682, and COMMENTS
(1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 192.
3 Reversing Ader v. Blau (1925, 2d Dept.) 211 App. Div. 532, 209 N. Y.
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conspicuous one, even in these times when the desire for pro-
cedural reform and improvement has become strong, widespread
and fruitful." After this illuminating disclosure of its emo-
tional reaction to new pleading situations it continues: "Of
course, we ought not to be led into taking it even under the al-
luring desire for progress and improvement if it is forbidden by
controlling rules and statutory provisions." It is submitted that
there are no such controlling rules and provisions.
Apparently the court's difficulty came from the fact that the
legislature, in adopting the liberal English rules as to joinder of
parties in the Civil Practice Act of 1920, failed to remove the old
shackles as to joinder of causes of action.- Thus persons may be
joined as plaintiffs where "if such persons brought separate
actions any common question of law or fact would arise"; 0 per-
sons may be joined as defendants "against whom the right to any
relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the al-
ternative"; and further, a plaintiff in doubt as to the persons
from whom he is entitled to redress, may join two or more, "to
the intent that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants
is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between the
parties".7 But causes of action, in order to be joined, must still
be "consistent with each other" and must fall within one of the
arbitrary classes of the statute, including the famous one of
"claims arising out of the same transaction or transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action"." The modern tendency
is to do away with those ambiguous restrictions.0 Yet a liberal
interpretation of them, viewing them, and in fact the entire sub-
ject of pleading, from the functional standpoint, would mahe of
them usable concepts. The court had previously given occasion
Supp. 784 (two justices dissenting), which in turn had reversed the Special
Term.
4 The opportunity thus afforded for confusion was discussed in Com-
x-TTs (1923) 32 YAmx LAW JOURNAL, 384.
N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 209.
N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 211; continuing that "judgment may be given
against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable,
according to their respective liabilities." Sec. 212 states that it is not nec-
essary that "each defendant shall be interested as to all the relief prayed
for, or as to every cause of action included in any proceeding against him."
For joinder of parties alternately responsible, see (1924) 33 YALu LAW
JoURNAL, 328, (1925) 35 YAL LAw JOURNAL, 113.
7 N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 213. The court says: "It is not claimed that
section 213 covers this action." One may be permitted to wonder why.
Was it because of the mere form of the complaint? See discussion of the
form of the complaint, infra.
s N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 258. Many codes do not contain the express
requirement of consistency.
9 In England and in some of the states restrictions on joinder of causes
have been substantially removed. COMMENTS (1923) 32 YA=n LAw Joun-
NAL, 384; Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1920) 18 Mxcn. L. Ruv. 571.
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to hope that such was its point of view.20 That hope is shattered
by the present case. Here the court holds (a) -inferentially-
that there are more than one cause of action, (b) that the causes
are inconsistent, (c) that they do not arise out of the same trans-
action or transactions connected with the same subject of action,
(d) that-probably-the common question of law or fact test does
not apply to the joinder of defendants," (e) that there is no such
common question here, and (f) that the defendants are not re-
sponsible "jointly, severally, or in the alternative". With each
one of these conclusions the writer disagrees.1 2
How should the somewhat vague provisions of the original code
be interpreted? The answer should be made only after the func-
tion of pleading in the trial of a case is determined. The com-
mon law writ system was, as is well known, really a corollary, or
perhaps an embodiment, of the substantive law of the time.
There was no right without a writ. The pleadings, therefore,
worked out in advance of the trial the law of the case. If the
plaintiff's lawyer misinterpreted the law, that was the plaintiff's
misfortune. The plaintiff was expected to foresee the form in
which the testimony at the trial would develop, to know tho ap-
plicable law, and to act accordingly. The procedural reform of
the nineteenth century was a reaction against this harsh system.
For it was substituted the pleading of the facts. No longer was
the plaintiff required to give the exact legal label applicable to
his case; he was only expected to give, in advance of the trial, his
20 See supra note 2.
11 This suggestion is contrary to the view ably expressed by Crouch, J.,
in Sherlocki v. Manwaren, supra, note 2, and seems contrary to the English
experience, where the extension of the privilege of joining plaintiffs has
resulted in the decisions in a like extension as to defendants. See Payno v.
British Time Recorder Co. [1921, C. A.] 2 K. B. 1; Eng. Ann. Prac. 1924,
224-226; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 384, 386. But see
(1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 681. It is true that the test is expressly stated
only in the section on joinder of plaintiffs. But the joinder of defendants
is stated substantially without restriction (N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, see. 211) ;
and hence if the test does not apply, surely a broader, rather than a nar-
rower rule, as intimated by the court, must apply. But the absence of a
stated restriction would render applicable the general theory of trial conven-
ience as the controlling test. This principle comes from the equity rules
of joinder which were adopted generally by the codifiers. Trial conven-
ience would largely turn on such points as whether the testimony of the
witnesses against each defendant separately would overlap; and hence, in
substance, we are back to our "common question of law or fact" test, proba-
bly as good a statement of the rule as we can make. Furthermore, the
defendants must of necessity be those who claim adversely to the plaintiffs
and, as the English experience shows, it seems impossible to determine one
set of parties without recourse to the methods of determining the other
set.
12In the limited space here available an extended discussion of each point
is not possible. It is believed, however, that the writer's position has been
made clear in the articles cited supra.
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best idea of how the past happenings which brought him into
court had occurred. After the trial had definitely established the
facts, the court was to give the proper legal judgment. Further-
more, pleading was to be relegated to the position of an aid to
the administration of justice, instead of being an end in itself.
And hence we have our modern conception of the function of
pleading, with particular emphasis upon its effect on the efficient
conduct of court business.
The change in attitude towards joinder of parties illustrates
this trend. At common law, joinder was only permissible where
the substantive right was viewed as joint, as in the case of joint
obligations or joint torts. Joinder as a purely procedural de-
vice to act as a short-cut in litigation was not contemplated at
common law. It came in, however, from the equity procedure
with the adoption of code pleading; and it is now being ex-
tended, as witness the Civil Practice Act. Hence it seems curi-
ous in the present case to find the court going back to the old
rules determining what are joint torts and who are joint tort
feasors to justify its decision.13
If then this functional aspect of pleading is considered, the pur-
pose of the pleadings is no longer to notify the court of the legal
labels involved but to give fair notice of the facts considered as
the ground of suit, and of as many facts as may be efficiently liti-
gated as a single suit. In the principal case we have the ques-
tion, how many causes of action are there presented? The court
thinks of the legal labels to be applied in deciding the case and
says, two, one for the 'negligence or 2nisance of the owner, one for
the malpractice of the physician.14 Yet the non-legal witnesses
are not going to divide up their testimony along those lines.
They are there to tell what they know concerning the facts lead-
ing to the death of the child. This is the gro:id or occasion of
the suit, and hence, in the practical and lay sense, is the cause of
action. Since pleading is to give a foretaste of the facts which
in turn come from lay witnesses, and since it is the shortening of
trials, rather than instruction of the court in the process of legal
labelling which the pleadings are designed to assist, the latter is
the proper content for the phrase in this connection. 5
Similar principles apply to the other terms considered in the
opinion. The court, thinking of the different rights of action
against each defendant, holds there is no common question of law
13 Cf. (1925) 34 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 335. The discussion was made in
connection with the holding that inconsistent causes of action were stated.
14 These express labels are used by the dissenting justices below. Sea
supra note 3.
'r See Clark, loc. cit. supra note 2. Professor McCaskill, however, be-
lieves that a more legalistic definition should be given to the concept catiSO
of action; he, too, favors the lay definition of transaction and traiactiong
connected with the same szubject of action. McCaskill, Action3 end
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and fact; and yet the practical reason for the form in which the
suit is brought is that the plaintiff is not sure who caused the
death of the child. Likewise the court holds that there is more
than one (legal) transaction, and more than one subject of the
action, to wit, the separate negligence of each defendant. It is
true that this legalistic, rather than lay or practical definition,
was the one made in certain early New York cases; but these have
been so far neglected in the later cases that their resurrection is
unexpected; and they have been definitely repudiated by other
courts and in other codes.-0 And finally the same explanation
holds of the big bugaboo to the court in the case, the requirement
of consistent causes of action. Here is no necessary inconsis-
tency in the facts as the lay witnesses will tell them; there is only
an inconsistency of legal theories. 7  Proof of the facts constitut-
ing one of the counts will not necessarily show that the other is
not true (unless perchance the case is made to turn wholly on the
use of the word "solely" in the second count) .1 This is the only
true basis of inconsistency, as the courts have come to see, not
only in connection with inconsistent causes of action,", but also
with inconsistent defenses, where the experience has been ex-
tensive and decisive.20  Moreover, under the new provisions the
Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 614. See also COMMENTS
(1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879.
16 See complete discussion by McCaskill, op. cit. supra note 15, at 643,
648; COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 862. Compare, e. g., Keep
v. Kaufmcn (1874) 56 N. Y. 332, with the cases in note 2, supra. See also
Payne v. N. Y. S. & W. R. R. (1911) 201 N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. 19; France
& Canada Steamship Co. v. Berwind (1920) 229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. V. 893.
For code provisions contrary to the principal case, see Conn. Prac. Bk.
1922, secs. 172, 187, at 282, 286; Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnipiac
Brewing Co. (1893) 63 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76; Sheen's N. J. Prac. Act,
1916, sec. 307, 222. Compare also Harris v. Avery (1869) 5 Kan. 146;
Scarborough v. Smith (1877) 18 Kan. 399; McArthur v. Moffett (1910)
143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445; Scott v. Waggoner (1914) 48 Mont. 536, 139
Pac. 454; Shaffer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. (1923) 300 Mo. 477, 254 S.
W. 257; Van Meter v. Goldfarb (1925, Ill.) 148 N. E. 391.
17 The court does not cite authority on this point; it says, "It seems too
clear for debate that such contradictory and repugnant theories cannot
be consistent and that plaintiff at this point fails to sustain his complaint."
18 The form of the complaint is discussed, infra.
19 Cardozo, J., dissenting, properly says: " the two causes of action are,
therefore, not inconsistent, since proof of the one will not exclude the
other, but both may coexist" See France & Canada S. S. Co. 'v. Berwind,
supra note 16; Joannes Bros. Co. v. Lamborn (1923) 237 N. Y. 207, 142
N. E. 587. There is also a good discussion in Siefkin v. Erie R. R. (1908,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 57 Misc. 222, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1060; Seiter v'. Bischoff
(1895) 63 Mo. App. 157; Rinard v. 0. K. C. & E. R. R. (1901) 164 Mo.
270, 64 S. W. 124; Astin v. Chicago etc. R. R. (1910) 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.
W. 265; (1911) 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 158, note.
20 See COMMENTS (1921) 1 OR. L. Rsv. 26; (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 251;
(1917) 1 MINN. L. REv. 94. As showing the liberal development, of.
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plaintiff may make alternative claims against different defend-
ants. The effect of the court's logic would be to wipe out of the
statute the provision permitting the suing of defendants alterna-
tively responsible.2' By this strict construction the new statue
does not amend the old; quite the contrary.
It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff has shown a proper
case for the application of the new provisions as to joining de-
fendants.22 True, it would have been more artistic for him to
have told his story in numbered paragraphs in a single count and
asked the court specifically to determine the responsibility of each
defendant.2 This would have indicated more directly his reliance
on these statutes. Yet in view of the confusion of the New
York cases on this matter of the use of separate counts, he ought
not t be criticised on the score of form alone. -  The main point
is that there is no possible doubt of his position, and a rewriting
of the complaint could not the more clearly inform the court and
counsel that he wishes to hold one or both of the two defendants
for the child's death. The case should not even have been re-
versed for the correction of the pleading, much less for the drop-
ping of one of the defendants.
Had the court contented itself with holding the joinder incon-
venient on the facts, comparatively little harn would have been
done. But the wording and tone of the opinion must necessarily
Derby v. Gallup (1860) 5 Blinn. 119, with McAlpinc v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. (1916) 134 Blinn. 192, 158 N. W. 967. For the early confusion in New
York, see the cases cited in Derby v. Gallup; the liberal rule has long pre-
vailed, Bruce v. Burr (1876) 67 N. Y. 237.
2 See svpra note 6. The court has apparently recognized joinder in
the alternative in Zenith Bathing Pavilion, Inc. v. Fair Oaks S. S. Corp.
(1925) 240 N. Y. 307, 148 N. E. 532, citing some of the lower court de-
cisions.
22 Sherlock v. Manwaren, supra note 2 (several doctors who successively
set the plaintiff's arm, may be joined in an action for damages; this
excellent decision would, it seems, not be sustainable under the instant
case) ; Cowles v. Eidlitz & Son, Inc. (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 121 Misc.
340, 201 N. Y. Supp. 254; NOTEs (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rsv. 203; Bullock
v. L. G. 0. Co. [1907, C. A.] 1 K. B. 361 and Berlcmann v. Brtih Motor Cab
Co., Ltd., [1914, C. A.] 3 K. B. 181 (collision cases to determine which
defendant is responsible); Compania Sansinena -e. Houldcr Bros. [1910]
2 K. B. 354; Re Beck; Attia. v. Seed (1918, C. A.) 118 L. T. 629; Payne v.
British Time Recorder Co., supra. note 11; Eng. Ann. Prac., 1924, 0. 16, r. 4,
7, and notes, pp. 224-229, 230, 231; (1907) 51 SoL. JoUR. 275; cf. Davic
v. Groner (1923, N. J.) 121 Atl. 446.
23 The confusion is discussed in Clark, loc. cit. supra note 2. See also
supra, note 15. For example, in the case of Heapby v. Eidlitz (1921, 1st
Dept.) 197 App. Div. 455, 189 N. Y. Supp. 431, the plaintiff made alter-
native allegations against the defendant-a practice permissible under the
more liberal codes, (1924) 34 YALE LAW JoTRNAL, 103; and the court per
Page, J., reached the surprising result that there were two causes of
action stated which were inconsistent and that therefore they iniest bo
separately stated.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
have the most baleful effect upon the lower New York courts,
most of whom, unfortunately, needed no spur towards pleading
legalism.2- The harm of such a decision is not limited to the par-
ticular case; it will continue long after this litigation, now so un-
necessarily to be lengthened, has at length been ended. It will
continue in fact until it is either overruled by the court or legisla-
ture; for that, it is confidently predicted, will be its fate.
C. E. C.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN OWNERS OF WRONGFULLY PLEDGED
SECURITIES
The cases occasionally present the situation where contribu-
tion is exacted from persons subjected to a common burden from
which they are freed at the expense of others in the same posi-
tion; and with the increasing complexity of commercial organi-
zation its frequent recurrence may be expected. In the recent
New York Case of Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. McGuire
(1925) 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632, several people deposited
with a broker negotiable securities for safe-keeping. After
wrongfully, pledging them with a bank for a loan, the broker
became bankrupt and the bank liquidated sufficient securities to
recover its loan, the securities of a few, however, remaining in-
tact. Reversing the trial judge, the court held that the remain-
ing securities should be sold and a pro rata division of the pro-
ceeds be made among all the depositors.
In the few cases involving this same factual situation the
courts have adopted two distinct views: first, that securities sur-
viving the bank's claim may be recovered in full by their origi-
nal owners without contribution ;2 and, second, that the remaining
securities shall be subject to such contribution as will effect a
pro rata distribution of the loss. The instant case represents
the application of the second view, and is in accord with the
24 Professor Rothschild, the successful counsel in the instant case, has
suggested that it is pressure of business which leads to the illiberal atti-
tude on the part of the lower New York courts. (1925) 25 COL. L. REV.
30, 41. It may be that the courts do hope to lighten their labors by dis-
posing of the cases before them on short and narrow pleading grounds;
but in the long run this can only serve to increase the congestion. Pres-
sure of business ought to lead to less, rather than more, insistence on
pleading technicalities.
,- I For the duty owed by a broker to his principal, see (1925) 34 YAx=
LAw JoURNAL, 449.
2In re McIntyre (1910, C. C. A. 2d) 181 Fed. 955; In ro McIntyre
(1911, C. C. A. 2d) 189 Fed. 46; Johnson v. Bixby (1918, C. C. A. 8th)
252 Fed. 103.
a Gould v. Central Trust Co. (1879, Sup. Ct. Spec. T., N. Y.) 6 Abb,
N. C. 381; McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co. (1897) 169 Mass. 7, 47 N. E.
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result reached by the courts in several analogous situations.
These are well-recognized in the law. In early times it was the
custom for the king to take at his own price "a tun of wine
before the mast and a tun behind" from every ship carrying
wine into a port of England.4  This was called "prisage of
wines"; 5 and those whose wine was spared were made to con-
tribute to the loss of him whose wine was sacrificed, it being
thought fairer that the loss arising out of the common liability
which by chance had fallen on one should be shared by all.0
Similarly with the notable doctrine of general average in mari-
time law, those who benefit when the goods of others are thrown
overboard to prevent a vessel's sinking, must contribute to make
good the loss.7  So, where under the will of his ancestor an heir
is held to take by descent in order to make him responsible for
debts overlooked by the testator, he has a right to contribution
242; Whitlock v. The Seaboard National Banzk (1899, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.)
29 Misc. 84, 60 N. Y. Supp. 611; Iq& re Wilson (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 252 Fed.
631; In re Toole (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 274 Fed. 337; In re Archer, Harvey
& Co. (1923, D. C. Md.) 289 Fed. 267; Vian v. Hilbcry (1923) 111 Neb.
232, 196 N. W. 153.
4 Referred to in I Hen. VIII, 1509, c. 5, sec. 6.
5 "Prisage of wines, mentioned in the statute 1 H. 8, c. 5, is a custom
by which the king out of every bark laden with wine under forty tuns,
claims to have two tuns at his own price." Rastell, Tcrincs do le Lcy
(1st Am. ed. 1812) 321. See Deerhzg v. Winc iwcca (1800, Exch.) 2 Bos.
& P. 270, 273; 1 Hargrave, Tracts (1st ed. 1787) 110 et seq.
GDeering v. Winchelsea, supra note 5.
7General average is explained in 5 Viner's Abrfdgmcnza (2d ed. 1792)
Contribution and Average, 561; "1. Average is commonly used by the law
merchant for that contribution which merchants and others make towards
losses sustained, where goods are cast into the sea, for the safeguard of
the ship, or of the other goods, and lives of the persons therein during
the tempest; and it is called average and contribution because it is pro-
portional and allotted after the rate of every man's goods aboard. 2. All
the parties interested are to bear the loss by a general contribution, and
a master or purser of a ship, shall contribute for the preservation thereof;
also the passengers, for such things as they have in the ship, be they
precious stones, pearls, or the like; and where passengers have no goods
in the ship, in regard they are a burden to it, it is said an estimate
shall be made of their apparel, rings, jewels, etc., towards a contribution
for the loss; and generally money and jewels, clothes, and all things in
the ship (except the clothes which are upon a man's body, or victuals,
etc. put on shipboard to be spent) are liable to average and contribution;
and the goods lost shall be valued, and the goods and merchandize saved
are to be estimated, which being known, a proportionable value shall be
contributed by the goods saved, towards reparation of the goods cast over-
board; and if in the casting over, or lightening of the ship, any of the
remaining goods are spoiled, or receive injury, the same must come into
the contribution for the damages received. 30. . . . Contribution may
not be had in any case but where the ship arrives in safety.' The ex-
tract from section 30 is suggestive of the analogous situation in the in-
stant case in that there must be some securities surviving the sale by
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from the other distributees of the will who, taking by purchase,
escaped responsibility for the overlooked debts.8 Likewise ten-
ants in common must contribute to the expense of discharging an
obligation affecting the whole estate and borne by one of them
And where sureties have discharged the surety debt they become
subrogated to the principal creditor's claims against their co-
sureties, and are entitled to contribution from them. °
These analogies indicate clearly the tendency of the courts to
apply the principle of pro rata contribution. 1' In them the issue
becomes whether or not there is a common bottom, a co-tenancy,
a co-suretyship, or any situation involving a common obligation.
The instant case presents precisely the same situation, although
in a more complex form. By choosing the broker to keep their
securities for them, the depositors, though acting independently
of each other, vested him with a power to subject their securities
to a common obligation; the securities in this case being nego-
tiable, the broker's repledging them was as effective as if he had
acted as their common agent chosen by them to do so.'
Of all the analogies mentioned, the instant case most closely
resembles the suretyship situation. Although it does not con-
the bank in order that there may be contribution. Compare also this
statement: "The principle upon which this contribution is founded, is not
the result of contract, but has its origin in the plain dictates of natural
law." 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (11th ed. 1873) sec. 490.
G Biederman v. Seymour (1841, Ch.) 3 Beav. 368. In Tomlinson v.
Bury (1887) 145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137, contribution was required in
an analogous situation.
9 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 691, note 87.
10 "The right to contribution results from the maxim that equality is
equity. . . . 'Natural justice says that one surety, having become so
with other sureties, shall not have the whole debt thrown upon him by
the choice of the creditor, in not resorting to remedies in his power, with-
out having contribution from those who entered into the obligation equally
with him. The obligation of co-sureties to contribute to each other is
. . . so generally acknowledged that courts of law in modern times have
assumed jurisdiction."' 1 Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty (3d ed.
1905) sec. 279; Lansdale v. Cox (1828, Ky.) 7 T. B. Mon. 401. Story,
op. cit. supra note 7, at sec. 492.
1"5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. 1919) sees. 2338, 5169.
"The principle is, that parties having a common interest in a subject-
matter shall bear equally any burden affecting it. . . . Equality is equity.
One shall not bear a common burden in ease of the rest. Hence, if as
often may be done, a lien, charge or burden of any kind, affecting several,
is enforced at law against one only, he should receive from the rest what
he has paid or discharged on their behalf. This is the doctrine of equitable
contribution, resting upon as simple a principle of natural justice as can be
put." Eliason v. Eliason (1869) 3 Del. Oh. 260, 263.
,2 "The various parties selected a common agent, and this agent used
its power to place them all under a common liability, thus virtually making
them all sureties for itself." McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co., supra note 3,
at 9.
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form to the orthodox suretyship, there being no contract,12 it is
considered to be such by many legal thinkers. Some writers
on suretyship make no reference to cases of this nature; but
those who do refer to them either imply that it is a suretyship 4
or openly say so.15 It has been recently called a "quasi-surety-
ship",1 a term which may be suitable in view of its combining
the undoubted effect of a suretyship with a marked difference
in form and manner of arising."7 For it appears that the securi-
ties themselves are the "sureties" in this case, as the owners en-
tered into no personal obligations or contract of suretyship.
Indeed this presents a situation which might accurately be
termed an impersonal suretyship."6 Nevertheless, whether it
3 Cf. "Suretyship is always a matter of agreement between the parties
expressed in terms or implied by their conduct or by circumstances. There
is no such thing as principal and surety without a contract relation be-
tween them expressed or implied." Brandt, op. cit. saupra note 10, at 7-S.
'4 Ames, Cases on Suretyship (1901) 549, includes the case of McBride
v. Potter-Lovell Co., supra note 3, thereby considering the case as one
involving suretyship, and his footnote to the case expressly treats it as
a case of suretyship. Also Stearns, Cases on Suretyship (1907) 5S9
includes the same case under the heading "Contribution between perzons
in the situation of a suretyship."
" Childs, Suretyship and Guaranty (1907) 322, citing McBride v. Pottcr-
Lovell Co., su'pra note 3, says, "Where an agent of various persons pledges
the notes of such persons for his debt, the owners of the notes are co-
sureties for the agent". And also on p. 333, citing both. cases, "If the
co-sureties are on different instruments, for different amounts, their equit-
able share will be proportionate to the amounts called for in the different
instruments." Spencer, Suretyship (1913) 200, in speaking of McBride
v. Potter-Lovell Co., supra note 3, says, "Indeed the equitable nature of the
doctrine of contribution may be illustrated by reference to a sort of in-
voluntary suretyship, if the term may be permitted. Thus where the
common agent of several principals acting in breach of his trust, validly
pledged the property or securities of all of them to secure his own debt,
it was held that the one whose property was thereby subjected to the dis-
charge of such debt was entitled to contribution from the others in pro-
portion to the value of the several interests so pledged." Whitlock: v.
Seaboard National Bank, supru note 3.
20 (1924) 22 MIcH. L. Rnv. 617-618. "The instant case is novel in that
all of the parties were induced to buy shares through the fraud of the
corporation and therefore if any co-suretyship relation existed, it did not
exist by any contract either expressed or implied. . . . In consideration
of these equitable principles, the court of chancery has seen fit to give
contribution in many cases where it would be hard to mahe out a co-
suretyship relation in the strict orthodox sense".
1A suretyship usually involves a contract between the principal and
the sureties and is voluntarily assumed. In the present case there is no
contract involving personal obligations, and the jeopardy of the securities
was involuntarily imposed.
is Ames, Cases on Suretyship, loc. cit. supra note 14, in note to McBride
v. Potter-Lovell Co., supra note 3, "The doctrine of the principal ease
applies equally although the co-suretyship created against the will of the
parties be real and not personal, as in Gould v. Central Trust Co., -upza
YALE LAW JOURNAL
is called a quasi-suretyship or an impersonal suretyship, it hag
the vital elements of a suretyship and the rule requiring contri-
bution among co-sureties should apply.
The chief cause of the conflict in these cases has been the
courts' failure to observe this similarity. The first view'0 taken
by the courts has an obvious and momentary appeal, inasmuch
as the original owners of the securities which are left did not
permit the repledge by the broker; indeed, such act was "practi-
cally a larceny". 20 But to support their contention that the se-
curities are theirs, freed of all other claims, is to assume the
question in point and to ignore the negotiable character of the
securities. The bank by selling all the securities to satisfy its
loan may extinguish the rights of all the original owners. This
indicates that under the first view it is a gamble as to who will
stand the loss when part of the securities are sufficient to dis-
charge the bank's claim. Then if the securities are time notes
which the bank cashes in their order of coming due, the accident
of maturity is the only virtue of those whose notes survive."'
Also, it would be possible for one of the original owners to pre-
vail upon the bank to reserve his securities until the last, thus
allowing the bank to show favoritism,. as, indeed, was attempted
in the instant case.
An additional factor seems to make the soundness of the second
view conclusive. If before any of the securities had been sold
any one of the original owners had applied for a marshalling of
the securities to discharge the bank's claim and for a pro rata
distribution of the balance, he could probably have secured such
aid. A precedent on this exact point is lacking; but there are
several dicta, 23 and the tendency of authority on marshalling of
note 3, in which case the subject matter of the pledge was not, as in
the principal case, the obligations, but the properties of different persons."
Cf. Garlick v. Strong (1832, N. Y.) 3 Paige Ch. 440; Vartio v. Underwood
(1854, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 18 Barb. 561, where the suretyship seems to be
real and not personal, as there is no contract of suretyship, but the land
alone can be moved against as surety.
19 See supra note 2.2 0 1n re McIntyre (1910, C. C. A. 2d) 181 Fed. 955; see also supra note 1.
21 "The notes were all pledged to secure the same indebtedness. The
fact that some of them fell due at earlier dates than others creates no
equity in favor of those which fell due last." McBride v. Pottr-Lovoll
Co., supra note 3, at 9. Cf. Trust Co. v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan
Co. (1896) 166 Mass. 337, 44 N. E. 340.
22 Cf. "The doctrine [of view two] is also justifiable in view of the
fact that the opposite rule would make it easy for the creditor to collude
with one surety in fraud of the other." (1924) 22 MicH. L. REV. 617, 618.
23 Cf. Gould v. Central Trust Co., supra note 3, at 386. "We suppose
that no one will doubt that if the situation of all of these wrongfully
pledged securities had been discovered before the sale of any of ttem, and
the owner of one lot had brought an action in equity to have them mar-
shalled and applied pro rata to the payment of the indebtedness for
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assets favors it.24 Thus, since the equities of the parties are
equal before the sale by the bank, indeed from the moment when
the broker wrongfully subjects them to a common jeopardy, it
is difficult to see why their equities do not remain equal after
the bank has sold part of the securities, and why they should
not obtain a sale of the remainder and a pro rata distribution
of the proceeds.
A third view, with which the court in the instant case at-
tempted to reconcile its decision, has been developed in this
situation. In a case - adopting this third view the broker held
three classes of securities, some as collateral for a loan, some
bought on margin for his customers, and the rest merely for
safe-keeping, the last of these surviving the sale by the bank.
In returning these intact to their former owners and refusing
contribution, the court held that those who had owned the securi-
ties outright had equities superior to the others, and the court
in the instant case stated that since these securities were of
different kinds, this conclusion was not contrary to the present
holding.
The soundness of this reasoning is not apparent. It is difficult
to see why the individual relations between the separate deposi-
tors and the brokers should have any effect on the depositors'
relations among themselves. To stress the relations between
the depositors and the broker is as if, in the prisage or general
average case, the payment or non-payment of freight to the cap-
tain were allowed to affect the respective equities of the parties;
or as if, in the case of the heir, the fact that his ancestor while
living had made an advancement to him; or, in the suretyship
case, the fact that some and not others of the sureties had owed
money to the assured were made operative. Such arguments to
avoid contribution in these cases would obviously be of no im-
portance, except as they might affect the proportion of the loss
each one has to contribute.2- The important facts are the com-
mon jeopardy of the securities of all the depositors and the free-
which they were pledged, such prayer for relief would have been granted.
Such relief would have been based on obvious principles of equity and
justice and it seems to us quite inconceivable that the application of thoze
principles is curtailed or destroyed because before the request for equality
of treatment is made the pledgee, as a matter of chance, has reached out
and taken securities of one holder for sale and left those of another in-
tact." Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. McGuirc, cited in text p. 92,
at 382, 146 N. E. at 634.
24See 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed. 1918) sec. 853 et scq. and
cases cited.
25 Tompkins v. Morton Trust Co. (1904, 1st Dept.) 91 App. Div. 274,
86 N. Y. Supp. 520. But contra: In re Archer, Harey & Co., supra
note 3.
26 Thus if A bought stock on margin paying ten per cent down, his
share of the balance after the bank's claim was discharged would be ten
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ing of some of them from that jeopardy by a sacrifice on the
part of the others. The resulting increase in the value of the
property interest of those depositors whose securities have sur-
vived constitutes an unjust enrichment which requires contribu-
tion to those at whose expense it was created.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS TO THE EFFECT OF SOVIET DECREES
One of the results of the growing practice of withholding polit-
ical recognition from de facto governments1 is seen in Rvssian
Reinsurance Company v. Stoddard (1925) 240 N. Y. 149, 147
N. E. 703, in which the New York Court of Appeals was called
upon to decide how much effect it would give to decrees of the
Soviet government. The plaintiff was a Russian insurance com-
pany incorporated under the Czar. In 1906, to protect its policy
holders and creditors in the United States, it had deposited
money and securities in trust with the Mercantile Trust Com-
pany which later was merged with the defendant company." In
1918, the Soviet government issued -a series of decrees purport-
ing to nationalize and liquidate all Russian insurance companies
and to confiscate their property. These edicts also forbade all
activity in Russia on the part of the stockholders or directors.
When the plaintiff's last insurance policy in New York expired,
the directors of the corporation met in France and directed their
agent to sue for the deposit.3 Recovery was contested on the
ground that, as a result of the confiscatory decrees, either the
Soviet government or the stockholders of the corporation might
later claim the deposit. The trial court dismissed" the action.
The Appellate Division assumed that the law of Russia, that is,
per cent of their value. Likewise if B gave securities as collateral for a
loan of half their value, his share would be fifty per cent; and if C gave
securities to the broker for safe-keeping, on which the broker had no
claim at all, his share would be one hundred per cent.
i For examples, see Fraenkel, Juristic Status of Foreign States (1925)
25 COL. L. REV. 544.
2 The fund was established to comply with a statute making such a de-
posit a prerequisite to doing fire insurance business in the state. N, Y.
Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 30, sec. 27. The suit was brought not only against
the Bankers' Trust Company which held the deposit, but necessarily against
Stoddard, state superintendent of insurance, since his sanction to the with-
drawal of the trust fund was required by statute. In addition, he was
interested because in certain situations which probably included the in-
stant case, he was given the power to take possession of the property and
conserve the assets of foreign corporations. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch.
30, sec. 63, subd. 4.
3 For the contents of the directors' resolution and the circumstances sur-
rounding its passage, see the opinion of the Appellate Division in Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925, 3d Dept.) 211 App. Div. 132, 136, 207
N. Y. Supp. 574, 579.
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the Russian "sovereign", under which the rights of the parties
were to be determined,- was the law of the last regime recognized
by our State Department.5 Under that law the plaintiff was an
existing corporation and hence was allowed to recover.
The result of this lower court decision was to give no effect to
the acts of foreign governments prior to political recognition and
was merely another way of stating that no effect will be given to
the acts of an unrecognized government, a doctrine followed in
several recent cases arising out of the non-recognition of Russia.0
The theory of the case, however, is based clearly on a misconcep-
tion of the term "sovereignty": that the "sovereign" government
is that government which has received political recognition. This
misconception is, it seems, a result of our State Department's
former policy of extending political recognition to each newly
constituted authority as soon as it actually obtained obedience
within its territories ;7 or, in other words, every "sovereign" gov-
ernment.8 Under that policy, it is evident, recognition and the
advent of sovereignty were practically concurrent in point of
time. It was not unnatural, therefore, that there should arise
the mistaken notion that sovereignty does not exist until recog-
nition is extended. The distinction is clear, however, under the
present policy of the executive department. To-day by the concept
"political recognition" our State Department seems to mean not
only a recognition of "sovereignty", but also, to a certain extent,
approval of the actions and doctrines of the new regimeY Ac-
New York law was actually applied, however, under the rule that
"unless it be shown that the Russian law is contrary to the law of the state
of New York, this court will apply our own law". Russian Rcin urance
Co. v. Stoddard, supra note 3, at 142, 207 N. Y. Supp., at 584.
The court cited, in support of its assumption, the rule that the State
Department decides who is the sovereign in a foreign land. Jonc3 -e.
United States (1890) 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80; Octjen v. Central
Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309; Canadian Car Co. v.
American Can Co. (1919, C. C. A. 2d) 258 Fed. 303.
6 Bov.re v. Bourne (1924, 1st. Dept.) 209 App. Div. 419, 204 N. Y. Supp.
866; Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Co. (1924, Sup. Ct.
Spec. T.) 207 N. Y. Supp. 588; see Joint Stock Company of Volgaka za Oil
and Chemical Factory v. National City Bank (1924, 1st Dept.) 210 App.
Div. 665, 670, 206 N. Y. Supp. 476, 480; aff'd (1925) 240 N. Y. 63.
See example in 1 Bloore, International Law Digest (1906) 137.
s The correct concept of a sovereignty is thus presented in Baty, So-
Called 'De Facto' Recognition (1922) 31 YAIE Lw JounNAL, 409: "Is
there in any given tract of country, an authority in fact obeyed throughout
that area, and not threatened in the field by any real efforts of subjugation
-then that district is a state, and the authority is its sovereign". For a
seeming confusion of the concepts of "sovereign" government and "politi-
cally-recognized" government, see NOTES (1925) 38 Htn'v. L. REV. 816, 819.
9 Baty, op. cit. supra note 8, at 470, condemns such a theory of recogni-
tion: "It is impossible to recognize a fact conditionally. Either it is a
fact or it is not. The very essence of recognition is that the recognizing
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cordingly, as in the case of Russia, recognition may be withheld
from an admittedly'0 de facto government. And the courts, in-
cluding the Appellate Division in the principal case, which pur-
port to apply the law of the "sovereign" can hardly make
it depend upon political recognition." Where they have
done so, they have had to ignore important economic and
social facts and their consequences. For example, the adminis-
tratrix appointed by an unrecognized regime to settle a private
estate was given no standing in our courts. 12  In the principal
case it meant that the court was obliged to ignore that the Soviet
decree had made the plaintiff corporation non-existent and the
directors unable to function legally in Russia and in the many
countries recognizing the Soviet regime.
If, however, the error in the reasoning of the Appellate Di-
vision be eliminated, and the law of the actual ruling government
of Russia be preferred over the law of the defunct Kerensky gov-
ernment, full effect ought to be given to the Soviet decrees.
Since the laws of recognized governments are not given effect
when contrary to the public policy of the United States,3 then
certainly a similar limitation should be placed on the decrees of
the unrecognized governments. But this doctrine, though lim-
ited, would hardly bring about a desirable result; for "public
state thereby declares that it has satisfied itself that the recognized au-
thority possesses the distinguishing marks of a state. . . . To say that
one recognizes that it has them, subject to its conduct being satisfactory in
other particulars is sheer nonsense. It is like telling a pupil that her sum
is right if she will promise to be a good girl". However, Mr. Baty gives
an example from United States history of this view of recognition which he
condemns.
10 When the Kerensky ambassador ceased to function in his official ca-
pacity at Washington, the status of the attach6 who remained was not con-
sidered to be changed. Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley Ry. (1923,
S. D. N. Y.) 293 Fed. 135 and 137, quoting a letter from Mr. Charles E.
Hughes, then Secretary of State. For cases which go on the assumption
that our government still recognizes the Kerensky regime as the "sov-
ereign" see The Penza (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 91; The Rogday (1920,
N. D. Calif.) 279 Fed. 130.
11 The State Department may indicate that a de facto government exists
without extending political recognition, and thus relieve the courts from
having to decide a political question. In the case of Russia, for example,
the State Department recognizes that the Soviet regime is a do facto gov-
ernment when it speaks of "the regime now functioning in Russia" (see
Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley Ry. supra note 10, at 137); and the
courts have followed the State Departments lead. Sokoloff v. National
City Bank (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 120 Misc. 252, 257, 199 N. Y. Supp. 855,
359.
12 Pelzer v. United Dredging Co. (1922, 1st Dept.) 200 App. Div. 646, 193
N. Y. Supp. 676.
13 This limitation is applied even in giving effect to the laws of other
states of the Union. Texas Ry. v,. Richards (1887) 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W.
627.
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policy" as used with reference to the laws of a recognized gov-
ernment, refers only to the nores of our country,14 and does not
consider "recognition" as a weapon of our foreign policy. To
apply the principle to Russia, for example, would take away many
of the political and economic disadvantages now suffered by the
Soviet regime because of its refusal to accept terms upon which
the United States would extend recognition. And recognition,
instead of being the powerful political weapon into which it has
developed, would sink into insignificance.
The Court of Appeals, however, in reversing the Appellate Di-
vision, took a middle ground. Apparently realizing that the
factual situation in Russia had, at the very least, made the plain-
tiff's rights in the trust fund uncertain, it held, Judge Crane dis-
senting, that while it did not recognize the Soviet "as entitled to
recognition as a state or government", yet "justice and common
sense" required it to "give effect to the conditions existing in
Russia" to the extent that the court would not assume jurisdic-
tion., The result seems commendable.' The theory underly-
ing the decision, suggested by Judge Cardozo in Sokoloff v.
National City Banik,, is that the actions of an unrecognized govern-
ment should not be given effect unless "public policy and justice"
demand it. "Public policy" here does not seem to be used in its
more limited sense. The principle laid down is apparently that
our courts should give effect to all acts of unrecognized de facto
governments which are not contrary to our mnores and which do
not materially weaken our foreign policy.
The roots of this theory are to be found in earlier cases where,
as in the instant case, the United States was unwilling to extend
recognition to a de facto government. During the War of 1812
the problem, came up as to the effect of decrees of the British
regime in captured American ports. 8 After the Civil War, many
questions arose as to the validity of acts done under laws of the
'4 See Giaizt Powder Co. v. Oregon Co. (1890, C. C. Or.) 42 Fed. 470, 474.
1 The refusal was "until the time comes when a government which we
recognize rules the country of the plaintiff's domicile, or at least until the
plaintiff corporation is able to re-establish its existence in that domicile
and the machinery provided by its charter for the management of its affairs
is again functioning". The ground on which the court directly based its
refusal to assume jurisdiction was that it could not protect the defendant
trustees from the possibility of a second suit in a foreign country which
recognizes the Soviet government and in which the defendant has aszets
which could be attached. This possibility is called 'very remote" in the
dissenting opinion. The court of such foreign government might find
itself in a dilemma; on the one hand it would be tempted to give effect to
the Soviet decree, and on the other to honor the United States judgment.
10 See Fraenkel, op. cit. supra note 1, at 566.
17 (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917. It is repeated in Jamea v. Second
Russian Insurance Co. (1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369.
Is United States v. Rice (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 246.
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Confederate States.19 And, in the Philippines, when native gov-
ernments temporarily took control away from United States au-
thorities, at least one court was called upon to decide what effect
should be given to the acts of the insurgent officials. 20 The courts
in these cases followed almost the same theory as that advanced
in the Sokoloff case. It was, however, stated in the positive form
that effect will be given to the acts of unrecognized governments
unless public policy and justice require otherwise, and the fol-
lowing acts were given effect:21 sale of property,2' levy of cus-
toms taxes, 2 creation. of a corporation for domestic business, 4
confiscation of domestic property,P5 payment of debts in the specie
of the regime,20 and all acts necessary to peace and good order
among citizens, such as sanctioning and protecting marriage, de-
termining laws of descent, regulating conveyence and transfer
of property, real and personal, and providing remedies for in-
juries to persons and estates.c7  The Civil War cases, on the
other hand, do not give examples of acts which, under the theory
of the Sokoloff case, should not be recognized because opposed to
"public policy and justice". But cases involving the present Rus-
sian regime have decided that being unrecognized, it cannot sue
in our courts ;28 that it cannot have effect given to its decrees of
"dissolution" of foreign corporations ;21 and that it cannot be
sued.30
19 See cases in notes 22, 24, 26, 27, infra.
2 0McLeod v. United States (1913) 229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955.
21 Discussions of these cases and conclusions as to their soundness are
found in Connick, Effect of Soviet Decrees in American Courts (1925) 34
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 499; Dickinson, Unrecognized Governments (1924)
22 MIcH. L. REv. 29, 118.
22 Thorington v. Smith (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 1.
23 United States v. Rice, supra note 18; McLeod v. United States, azpra
note 20.
24 United States v. Insurance Companies (1874, U. S.) 22 Wall. 99.
25 Terrazas v. Holmes (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 848.
26 Delmas v. Merchants National Insurance Co. (1871, V. S.) 14 Wall.
661.
27 Texas v. White (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 700; Williams V. Bruffy (1877)
96 U. S. 176; Baldy v. Hunter (1897) 171 U. S. 388, 18 Sup. Ct. 890.
2 8 Russian Government v. Cibrario (1923) 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E.
259. For a criticism of the idea that power to sue should depend upon
political recognition, see COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 534.
To allow an unrecognized government to sue, it would seem, in the great
majority of cases would involve trespassing on the political field. The
Cibrario case, supra, shows how many different aspects of the case must
be weighed by the judge, and consequently how vague and difficult to lo-
cate is the line of "public policy and justice".29 Second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller (1924, C. C. A. 2d) 297 Fed.
404; Sokoloff v. National City Bank, supra note 17. For one English
judge's view seemingly contra, see COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JoR-
NAL, 83, 85.
30 Wulfsohn v. Soviet Government (1923) 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24;
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If it be suggested that the courts are not logical in refusing to
allow the regime to sue while at the same time they give effect to
some of its acts, it may be answered that more than logic enters
into the problem. Nevertheless there is a weakness in the theory
apparently advanced by the Court of Appeals. For it is clear at
once that to the judges is given the task of deciding (1) whether a(,regime" is actually de facto and (2) whether our foreign policy
has been materially weakened; and both of these decisions belong
primarily to the executive department. Though dissatisfaction
with the recognition policy of the State Department may preju-
dice decisions, the doctrine of the instant case seems the most
workable one if applied with the realization that "where there is
danger of embarrassing the political department, the court should
be conservative".3 '
At first thought, the refusal of the court to assume jurisdiction
would seem to imply that if the Soviet regime obtains recognition,
the trust fund would go to it, under the rule that political recog-
nition makes valid the previous acts of the government recog-
nized.- In England, a court decision has prevented such a
result, 3 and a late decision of the New York Court of Appeals indi-
cates that this result would also be prevented in the United
States. U In the instant case the court was careful to point out
Nankivel v. Omnsk All-Russian Govcrnrnwnt (1923) 237 N. Y. 150, 142 N.
E. 569; Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 163 U. S. 250, 13 Sup. Ct. 83. In
an English case decided prior to Great Britain's recognition of Russia,
action was allowed against agents of the Soviet government who brought
goods which had been confiscated at the plaintiff's expense within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the court. Luther v. Sagor [1921] 1 K. B. 456. The
case was later reversed because recognition had been granted, with a dictum
to the effect that the first judgment was correct on the facts. Luthcr v.
Sagor [1921, C. A.] 3 K. B. 532. If no property of the unrecognized gov-
ernment was subject to attachment, however, proceedings would be seem-
ingly futile.
3" Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 21, at 133.
32 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra note 5; Ricaud v. American Metal
Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312. Under the rule the court is
called upon to decide the political question of when the de facto government
came into existence, i. e., the date from which its decrees will be recognized.
But see the Appellate Division opinion in the principal case, s71pra note 3, at
141, 207 N. Y. Supp. at 583: "We cannot even contemplate that recogni-
tion of that (Soviet) government would have such relation back . . .
'in view of the rule that public policy must always prevail over comity'.
Russian Republic v. Cibrario 235 N. Y. 255, 203, 139 N. E. 259, 262."
33 Russian Commercial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escornpto do Mulhouse [1925
H. L.] A. C. 112. But whether the English court correctly interpreted the
law of Soviet Russia has been questioned by Ai. Rakowsky, Soviet delegate
in London. (1924) 5 RUsSIAN INFORnATION AND REVIw, No. 5.
34 Joint Stock Company of Volgakama Oil and Chcmical Factory v. Na-
tional City Bank (1925) 240 N. Y. 363. The opinion states that the Soviet
decrees of nationalization did not dissolve the plaintiff company; that an
express or necessarily implied intent to terminate the plaintiffs' existence
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that the responsibility for making all Soviet actions valid would
be upon the State Department, and suggests that unconditional
recognition is not the only road open to executive officials. A
treaty to be required as a condition precedent to political recogni-
tion could well settle the status of foreign branches of corpora-
tions which Soviet Russia has decreed to be nationalized. Such
a treaty seems not at all unlikely.
must be shown. "We need not go so far" as the Mulhouse case, supra note
33, the court stated, but that opinion is quoted. Crane J., who wrote tho
opinion repeated his view that no effect whatever be given to the acts of an
unrecognized government, but the majority of the court decided that their
interpretation of the decrees made consideration of that question unnec-
essary.
